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Schizophrenia-spectrum psychoses are highly complex and 
heterogeneous disorders that necessitate multiple lines of 
scientific inquiry and levels of explanation. In recent years, 
both computational and phenomenological approaches to 
the understanding of mental illness have received much inter-
est, and significant progress has been made in both fields. 
However, there has been relatively little progress bridging 
investigations in these seemingly disparate fields. In this con-
ceptual review and collaborative project from the 4th Meeting 
of the International Consortium on Hallucination Research, 
we aim to facilitate the beginning of such dialogue between 
fields and put forward the argument that computational psy-
chiatry and phenomenology can in fact inform each other, 
rather than being viewed as isolated or even incompatible 
approaches. We begin with an overview of phenomenological 
observations on the interrelationships between auditory-ver-
bal hallucinations (AVH) and delusional thoughts in general, 
before moving on to review several theoretical frameworks 
and empirical findings in the computational modeling of 
AVH. We then relate the computational models to the phe-
nomenological accounts, with a special focus on AVH and 
delusions that involve the senses of agency and ownership of 
thought (delusions of thought interference). Finally, we offer 
some tentative directions for future research, emphasizing the 
importance of a mutual understanding between separate lines 
of inquiry.
Key words: computational psychiatry/phenomenology/
modeling/agency/ownership
I think everyone hears a voice that’s their thoughts.It’s only 
when those voices start having their own mind and willpower 
that you’re hearing voices in your head.
(paranoid_cataclysm, July 31, 2009; Raballo15)
Introduction
Psychosis is a syndrome characterized by severe distortions 
in one’s sense of reality. The most prominent symptoms 
of psychosis are delusions and hallucinations, which are 
usually defined as fixed false beliefs and perceptions with-
out corresponding external stimuli, respectively. However, 
such definitions have been critiqued as rather arbitrary if  
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not oversimplistic and as failing to capture the full com-
plexity and heterogeneity of the experiences of psychosis.
Both phenomenological and neuroscientific approaches 
have attempted, albeit in very different ways, to address 
some of this complexity in psychotic experiences. However, 
there is a substantial explanatory gap between these 
approaches.1 One possibility for addressing this gap is 
computational psychiatry, a newly emerging field that uses 
formal mathematical models to delineate mechanisms of 
brain function and disease states.2 This approach has the 
advantage of being able to bridge basic and clinical neu-
roscience research and potentially offer unifying accounts 
not only within a given psychiatric disorder but across dif-
ferent symptoms and diagnostic domains.3 Here we begin 
by reviewing the relationships between auditory-verbal 
hallucinations (AVH) and delusional thoughts in schizo-
phrenia-spectrum psychoses, before offering critical analy-
ses of current theories from different levels of explanation.
We argue that delusional thoughts—in particular, delu-
sions about the agency and ownership of thought (ie, delu-
sions of thought interference)—and AVH are not best 
viewed as isolated mental events but are intricately related 
phenomena not only in degree but also in kind, ie, under 
certain circumstances delusions and hallucinations may not 
be clearly separable. This view was actually supported by 
French psychiatrist Esquirol,4 who formally introduced the 
concept of hallucination in psychiatry in the 19th century 
and whose legacy has sadly been largely forgotten. Esquirol’s 
notion was that hallucinations are a form of delirium and 
not a perception that “makes patients believe they have a 
perception (added italics),”5 therefore stressing the belief-
like and cognitive/intellectual aspects of hallucination. With 
Esquirol’s original insight in mind, we aim to review com-
putational models of AVH and evaluate how these models 
are best applied to phenomenological reports of AVH and 
delusions of thought interference (eg, delusions resulting 
from an experience of thought insertion), before arguing 
that these symptoms may just be different manifestations 
of intrinsically similar neural processes, eg, processes using 
Bayesian probabilistic inference.6 For more details about the 
background, see Supplementary Materials.
The Blurred Lines Between Thought and Perception
Although they are usually allocated into separate descrip-
tive silos (ie, according to the conventional dichotomy 
between aberrant perception and cognition, respectively), 
AVH and delusional thoughts share important phenome-
nological features, such as an autocentric, self-referential 
architecture and profound alterations of lived space, time, 
and intersubjectivity.7–12 This is particularly manifest in 
prototypical “voices” (eg, commenting and imperative 
voices) and transitivistic delusions or thought interfer-
ence (eg, delusions of control, thought insertion, thought 
withdrawal, and thought broadcasting), and also in delu-
sions of reference and persecution. Recent empirical 
analyses13 indicate indeed that AVH articulate themselves 
in an experiential realm that is in-between the phenom-
enology of cognition and perception, retaining features 
of both an altered stream of thought and quasi-material 
aspects of sensorial givenness.12,14–16,61
The psychopathological interconnectedness of delu-
sional thoughts and AVH may be somewhat circular (at 
least in the sense of potential co-perpetuation): the former 
may increase the proclivity to thematize anomalies of the 
stream of consciousness as AVH, and, conversely, AVH 
could promote the further articulation of delusional themes. 
Moreover, any account that posits delusional thoughts and 
AVH as descriptively separable symptoms needs to take 
heed of autobiographic accounts18 as well as phenomeno-
logical research,19,20 suggesting that both are consequences 
of a psychotic transformation of the medium of conscious-
ness. This was relatively clear for major authors of the 
last century; eg, Bleuler21 emphasized that AVH operate 
through a comprehensive transitivistic delusional ideation: 
“the voices not only speak to the patient, but they pass elec-
tricity through his body, beat him, paralyze him, take his 
thoughts away” (1911/50, p.94). Minkowski22 characterizes 
schizophrenia as arising from the trouble générateur and a 
“loss of vital contact with reality.” Even Jaspers,23 who sug-
gested primary schizophrenic delusions may be outside the 
realm of “understandability” (although secondary delu-
sions may still be amenable to empathic understanding), 
insisted that the task of psychopathology was to focus on 
“actual conscious psychic events,” rather than isolated, cli-
nician-identified symptoms no matter how un-understand-
able they may seem to be. Yet, contemporary empirical 
research has rediscovered such intersection between AVH 
and delusional thoughts only recently.13,24
One prominent contemporary theory of schizophrenia 
that incorporates this perspective was developed by Sass 
and colleagues,25,26 who view symptoms of schizophrenia 
as manifestations of a disturbance of ipseity or basic self-
experience, ie, of being a “vital and self-coinciding subject 
of experience” (p.  428). Thought, perception, and action 
come to feel strange, awkward, foreign, extrinsic to, and 
alienated from oneself.27,28 Fuchs29 has put forward a some-
what different hypothesis, arguing that both AVH and delu-
sional thoughts arise from a transformation of the world in 
which worldly objects lose their independent existence (ie, 
they are no longer available to others and perceivable from 
a variety of other perspectives), which can result in objects 
seeming to exist only for oneself, as well as the experience of 
special self-directed meanings or messages associated with 
objects and events (delusions). In this context, perception-
like phenomena that are not in fact accessible to others 
(hallucinations) may take on an ontological status similar 
to what others may consider to be “objective” perceptions. 
(However, as Ratcliffe30 notes, these accounts do not address 
some potentially crucial aspects of hallucinations, includ-
ing their specific (and often quite negative) content, the 
perceptual (or quasi-perceptual) qualities of hallucinations 
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(compared to other manifestations of disturbed ipseity), 
and, perhaps most importantly, the fact that hallucinations 
occur not only for persons with ipseity disorders (ie, schizo-
phrenia), but also for persons with trauma histories, mood 
disorders, or no clinical history at all.) It should be noted 
that hallucinations, at least when described in schizophrenic 
psychoses, often retain centrality of the self or a kind of sol-
ipsistic and subjectivized quality31–34 and, for many, are dis-
tinguishable from typical perceptions.35,36
Indeed, it has been argued that how patients with schizo-
phrenia access conscious information (including an elevated 
threshold to consciousness) plays a crucial role in the merg-
ing of cognition and perception, and it is likely that a uni-
fying mechanism underpins both processes. The proposal 
of Northoff and Huang37 of a temporospatial theory of 
consciousness (TTC) links the 4 dimensions of conscious-
ness (level/state, content/form, phenomenology/experience, 
and cognitive processing/reporting) and offers an account 
of the brain as situated in time and space while construct-
ing its own temporospatial structure. In particular, the con-
cept of “temporospatial alignment” is considered disrupted 
in schizophrenia relating to the content and form of con-
sciousness.38 Although the TTC does not explicitly incor-
porate the relationships between consciousness and self, the 
brain regions (including cortical midline structures) thought 
to underlie self-experience are also at least partly responsible 
for the alignment and integration of conscious experience. 
This offers tentative evidence that there may be a common 
basis underlying thought and perception that are embed-
ded in the very structure of consciousness. As Henriksen 
et al27 note, “From a phenomenological perspective, AVHs 
in schizophrenia are not primarily sensory-perceptual but 
rather cognitive phenomena arising from a partial dissolu-
tion of certain structures of self-consciousness”(p.166).
Such work may be used to frame and guide empirical 
research on schizophrenia and hallucinations; thus, com-
putational models of hallucinations and other psychotic 
symptoms should be able to account for and explain not 
only isolated symptoms but also symptoms as they are 
experienced, as interrelated and embedded within an over-
all context of patients’ selfhood and relationship with the 
world. As Larøi et al39 note, future work on hallucinations 
must acknowledge their status as “meaningfully interrelated 
facets of a more comprehensive and characteristic gestalt 
change in the patient’s experience (field of consciousness) 
and existence” (p.  235). In the section “Modeling AVH: 
Computational and Cognitive Frameworks,”we review 
some of the most prominent models in the computational 
psychiatry of AVH research and consider how they may fit 
in the wider framework of altered subjective experiences.
Modeling AVH: Computational and Cognitive 
Frameworks
Any model of hallucinations must be constrained by 
empirical neurobiological findings, such as those reviewed 
in Supplementary Materials. In this section, we first pro-
vide a brief  overview of a network model of AVH, fol-
lowed by one of the most dominant cognitive models of 
AVH (the inner speech model) while integrating it with 
neuroscientific and computational theories. Finally, we 
focus on a relatively recent hierarchical Bayesian model 
of AVH and how it relates to our understanding of AVH.
Attractor/Network Models
An attractor is a set of configurations to which the states 
of a dynamical system are drawn.40 Examples in neu-
roscience include the attractors used to model working 
memory processes in the prefrontal cortex17,41–43 and ocu-
lomotor control44 and to account for the activities of hip-
pocampal cells involved in navigation.45,46 They have also 
been used to model features of schizophrenia.47,48
The dynamics of a system can be described in terms 
of its “energy” landscape. Attractors manifest as regions 
of low energy (basins) in the energy landscape. In a neu-
ral network, the shape of the landscape is determined by 
the strength of connectivity between neuronal popula-
tions. This concept complements many other modeling 
approaches. For instance, theories founded on Bayesian 
inference either implicitly or explicitly rely on the exist-
ence of minima in an energy functional, specifically, a 
free energy (cf  predictive coding49) or an approximation 
of this (cf  loopy belief  propagation50).
Perceptual inference can be formulated as a process 
of descent from high to low energy.51–53 False percep-
tions, such as hallucinations, might in theory result from 
changes in the shape of the energy landscape. It has been 
proposed that disruptions in GABA and NMDA receptor 
conductance (modulated by dopamine54) in the prefron-
tal cortex could result in such changes.55 For example, a 
reduction of excitatory pyramidal-inhibitory interneuron 
connectivity would mean that other states are less sup-
pressed when one group of neurons is active. An increase 
in stochastic fluctuations in firing rates would make it 
easier to jump from one basin to another.
This proposition potentially accounts for several phe-
nomena in schizophrenia including hallucinations, while 
also accommodating prominent neurobiological theories 
of disrupted excitation-inhibition (E-I) balance56,57and 
aberrant dopamine signaling.58 An alternative to modu-
lating synapses to disrupt the energy landscape is to 
remove connections between neurons. Such “pruning” 
approaches have successfully reproduced (single word) 
hallucinations in silico, but neither model has so far dem-
onstrated the spontaneous production of more fluent 
speech.59
Inner Speech/Comparator Model
There are good reasons to think that AVH involve motor 
processes. Perhaps the most convincing is that they 
involve the consequences of  an action (ie, speech), in 
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contrast to other forms of  hallucinations. This is another 
reason for our focus on AVH, as nonverbal hallucina-
tions are very likely to have different mechanisms.60,61  
The “comparator” or “inner speech” model is an influen-
tial model of  AVH based on predictive motor processes—
efference copy and the forward model. It proposes that 
efference copies of  motor commands are sent to a “for-
ward model” that uses them to predict their sensory con-
sequences in advance of  sensory feedback. Successful 
prediction may attenuate the perception of  those sensory 
consequences and also result in the feeling of  agency for 
a movement, whereas prediction errors may lead one to 
infer the environment or some other agent was respon-
sible for the discrepancy. Patients with schizophrenia 
are known to have problems with prediction (eg, of  the 
motion of  targets during smooth pursuit),62 and if  these 
problems extend to predicting the consequences of  one’s 
own movements, then the consequent loss of  the feeling 
of  agency for self-generated movements could lead to the 
belief  that another agent is responsible for them: ie, pas-
sivity symptoms.63 In terms of  AVH, the sensation that 
AVH come from someone else/another source other than 
one’s self  could also be accounted for by failures in self-
monitoring. The externality and alien nature of  AVH are 
indeed important phenomenological features in many—
but not all—cases. This model is bolstered by numerous 
empirical findings.64,65 In addition, the self- and source-
monitoring models of  AVH have benefited from studies 
using signal detection theories and emotional process-
ing, where a sense of  perceptual hypervigilance linked 
to heightened emotional states (threat, fear, and anxiety) 
results in an urgent need to reduce uncertainty of  the 
signal and lowers the threshold of  auditory perception, 
especially when it comes to internally generated stimuli.66 
Interestingly, this kind of  “jumping-to-conclusions” or 
rapid judgments based on limited sensory or cognitive 
evidence are also key to delusion formation.67
The ipseity disturbance model suggests that such 
source-monitoring disturbances could be a reflection 
of the hyperreflexivity or tendency to take tacit acts of 
consciousness as an object of reflection rather than the 
implicit medium of awareness of the world25 (although 
Henriksen et al27 contest the assumption in source-moni-
toring theories that patients perceive their hallucinations 
as real). This model points to a notion of selfhood that 
it maintains a world- or object-directed intentionality; 
when intentionality is no longer prereflectively inhabited, 
thoughts or other intentional acts may become distorted 
and take on physical or perceptual qualities. Indeed, 
early experiences of subtle changes in the experience of 
cognition and stream of consciousness, including diffi-
culties distinguishing between thought and perception, 
may predict the later development of hallucinations.68 
Other models suggest that AVH may be more related to 
a disruption of anticipation of certain kinds of anxiety-
producing thoughts: certain unwanted thoughts may be 
anxiously anticipated and therefore imbued with unusual 
object- and perception-like qualities.69 This model may 
help to explain the content-specific nature of many AVH, 
suggesting that it is not all thoughts that feel alienated 
and external, but only those with particularly disturbing 
or distressing content. An alternative model may be a bet-
ter explanation for false inference about communications 
from another agent; thus, we next discuss the hierarchical 
Bayesian model of AVH. For some of the critiques on the 
comparator model, see Supplementary Materials.
A Hierarchical Bayesian Model of AVH
A popular view of  the brain among contemporary neu-
roscientists is that it instantiates a hierarchical Bayesian 
model of  its environment. This view has several impor-
tant implications for hallucination research.70 First, 
different levels in the brain’s hierarchical organization 
represent the causes of  sensory data at levels below in 
an increasingly abstract way as one ascends the hierar-
chy.71 Second, the brain uses or approximates Bayesian 
inference to infer these causes: meaning it must combine 
prior beliefs about these causes with sensory data (in 
the form of  a “likelihood”)—weighted by their relative 
certainty (or “precision”)—to make its inferences, or 
“posterior beliefs.” Crucially, the incorrect assignment 
of  precision leads to failures of  inference, eg, if  sensory 
precision is underestimated or prior precision overes-
timated, then the prior will dominate the posterior: a 
potential cause of  hallucinations of  any sort.49 Third, 
most priors within the model—eg, the expected sound 
of  someone’s voice or the content of  their speech—are 
learned from previous inferences: known as “empirical 
priors.”
Numerous neural message–passing schemes can per-
form Bayesian inference. One such is predictive coding, 
in which descending messages from higher levels are pre-
dictions of quantities at lower levels, and ascending mes-
sages are prediction errors—the difference between the 
predicted and the actual values—weighted by their preci-
sion.49 An alternative is belief  propagation, in which the 
descending and ascending messages are priors and likeli-
hoods.72 If  the brain uses predictive coding, how might it 
encode precision? Given precision changes the weights of 
priors and likelihoods in inference without altering their 
means, its neural implementation ought to increase the 
“gain” of neural messages without generating new mes-
sages itself. One obvious candidate mechanism is synaptic 
gain, ie, the factor by which presynaptic input is multi-
plied to generate postsynaptic potentials. Synaptic gain 
can influence the precision of encoded states at differ-
ent scales: both at the neural level, via neuromodulatory 
receptors such as the N-methyl-d-aspartate (NMDA) 
receptor and receptors for dopamine and acetylcholine, 
and at the network level, by altering the robustness of 
neural representations to other inputs or stochastic 
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fluctuations in neural activity. In particular, NMDA 
receptors on inhibitory interneurons—thought to be dys-
functional in schizophrenia73—may determine the extent 
to which one neural “explanation” for sensory input can 
suppress competing “explanations.”
Many paradigms—eg, visual illusions, oculomotor 
pursuit tasks, EEG oddball tasks, sensory attenuation 
tasks, and belief  updating tasks—indicate that patients 
with schizophrenia have an imbalance between the preci-
sion of priors (too low) and sensory evidence (too high).74 
In other paradigms in schizophrenia, however, priors 
dominate sensory evidence75,76—interestingly, in both 
cases these were recently learned perceptual priors. There 
are various possible explanations for these apparently 
opposite imbalances in different paradigms. One is that 
the hierarchy is so deep that, eg, decreases in midlevel 
synaptic gain could be expressed as decreased precisions 
of either priors (for the levels below, which receive predic-
tions from this level) or likelihoods (for the levels above, 
which receive prediction errors from this level), depend-
ing on whether the paradigm depends more on lower or 
higher levels for its effects. Another is that schizophrenia 
may involve a failure of adaptive control of  synaptic gain, 
rather than simply too much or too little at different lev-
els. Belief  propagation account of Jardri and colleagues 
proposes these imbalances come about due to priors 
or likelihoods being “overcounted” due to disinhibited 
message passing,76–78 rather than alterations in synaptic 
gain, although this and other belief  propagation models 
also contain precision terms that could be encoded by 
synaptic gain.
Under a hierarchical Bayesian account of AVH, hal-
lucinations must result from overprecise priors that are 
not corrected by (relatively imprecise) likelihoods (ie, the 
precision of the mapping between auditory input and its 
possible causes is low).71 This is because a false-positive 
inference requires that a percept is internally generated 
and is not derived from ascending sensory information. 
An interesting question is where such priors might be: 
Are they at the higher levels of the model (eg, prefrontal 
cortex), imposing themselves on middle levels, or are they 
at middle levels (eg, superior temporal cortex), imposing 
themselves on lower levels (ie, empirical priors)? The latter 
could be an instance of failure to attenuate sensory preci-
sion (ie, synaptic gain), as is found in the force-matching 
paradigm.64,65,79 In this case, increased precision/gain may 
be of autonomous neural activity in higher auditory cor-
tex (as proposed by “attractor state” models reviewed in 
“Attractor/Network Models” section) rather than of sen-
sory input. The former case may result from a compensa-
tory increase in prior precision.80 Recent modeling of the 
former option using a Bayesian framework indicates that 
AVH can occur when an agent engaging in dialogue has 
a strong prior belief  that it is listening to a voice and an 
imprecise likelihood mapping. When it expects to hear a 
voice but none is present, it generates a hallucinated voice 
to satisfy its expectations.81 The fact that this expected 
voice is that of a conversational partner may also play a 
role in explaining aberrancies of agency in AVH.81
Numerous kinds of  priors could contribute to 
AVH. A  large cluster analysis of  AVH phenomenol-
ogy (largely schizophrenia) indicates different subtypes 
exist—memories, first-person AVH, other-person AVH, 
and unintelligible sounds82—even within one person. 
This suggests that the common pathology lies in an 
area that receives predictions about speech from multi-
ple sources (ie, superior temporal cortex) but is unable 
to sufficiently attenuate their precision, such that these 
priors dominate resulting percepts. This will especially 
be the case if  the precision of  incoming sensory data 
is low. In the case of  memories and first-person AVH, 
predictions are likely to come from medial temporal 
lobe and a network of  frontal areas including inferior 
frontal gyrus40,83 (also associated with “inner speech”), 
respectively.
Given that AVH develop increasing complexity over 
time,84 the likeliest explanation is that identities of  other-
person voices are empirical priors that are inferred 
from previous hallucinations. For example, hearing a 
muffled insult might create an image of  someone whose 
voice that might be, which may generate expectations 
about other insults. The development of  empirical pri-
ors concerning the origins of  AVH will have a critical 
impact on the extent to which the hallucinating subject 
feels he or she has control over the AVH—a key distin-
guishing factor between psychotic and healthy voice-
hearers.84,85 If  voices that could be ascribed to distorted 
perceptions or hallucinations are instead attributed to 
an external agent, the voice-hearer’s sense of  autonomy 
will diminish.
Another key phenomenological difference is the emo-
tionally negative content (usually) associated with clinical 
or psychotic voice-hearers; although this has not yet been 
systematically studied under the Bayesian framework, 
there is accumulating evidence pointing toward the roles 
played by past memories (eg, of trauma), which may act 
as top-down expectations relating to voice content,80,86 
especially in memory-related subtypes of AVH.
This model makes predictions that cohere with empir-
ical investigations: (1)Loss of NMDA receptor function 
on inhibitory interneurons in temporal areas might lead 
to an increase in resting activity (it is harder to sup-
press “noise”) but a decrease in task-related (including 
prediction error-related86) activity (task-related activity 
is inversely correlated with the baseline level)—both of 
which have been demonstrated in functional magnetic 
resonance imaging studies with schizophrenia patients 
with AVH,86 but are hard to explain using the “com-
parator” model.80(2)Inhibitory interneuron dysfunction 
in schizophrenia may make it harder for auditory cor-
tex to generate γ oscillations in response to 40-Hz tones 
(which depend on interactions between pyramidal cells 
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and interneurons).87 (3)Voice-hearers ought to demon-
strate more precise empirical priors than controls—this 
has been shown in both hallucinating patients with schiz-
ophrenia and healthy voice-hearers, using tasks in which 
learned contexts influence uncertain sensory data88 (see 
figure 1; also Cassidy et al89).
The Bayesian model of AVH may have phenomenolog-
ical correlates in the notion of aberrant salience, which 
reflects a tendency to attend to irrelevant or background 
perceptual details (as opposed to details that are more 
relevant for goal-oriented behavior). It has been sug-
gested that persons with schizophrenia may demonstrate 
this anomalous processing of perceptual stimuli. Such 
attentional and perceptual disturbances may result in 
the assignment of greater importance to irrelevant stim-
uli,90 rather than allowing one’s attention to be directed 
(and corrected) by more accurate information and prior 
knowledge about the environment. The ipseity distur-
bance model suggests that this salience disruption results 
from a loss of “grip” or “hold” on one’s engagement with 
the environment, whereby disturbances in basic selfhood 
are likely to disrupt one’s pragmatic and goal-oriented 
engagement with the world.26 It may also impact the ina-
bility to appropriately correct or update one’s interpreta-
tions about various perceptual inputs, and the tendency 
to interpret ambiguous or “noisy” stimuli according to 
strong overprecise (perhaps emotionally salient) priors.69
AVH and Delusions of Thought Interference
Whether a thought has vocal, audible, or agentive qual-
ities may partly account for the content of the delusion 
and the way it is reported in research protocols and clini-
cal encounters. Typically, audible voices will be described 
as AVH and soundless voices as thought insertion.12 Yet 
such descriptions may impose an artificially precise struc-
ture on an intrinsically ambiguous form of experience, 
which also includes emotional distress and the elabo-
rations, interpretations, and defenses produced by the 
patient. The above theories are compelling in their abil-
ity to explain the development and maintenance of AVH 
from the perspectives of neurobiology, perceptual and 
motor systems, and cognitive modeling. In this section, 
we consider how some of these models might be able to 
shed light on several major phenomenological features of 
AVH and thought insertion, especially findings of their 
interrelationship and experiential similarities.
In thought insertion, the subject reports that thoughts 
arrive in their mind “out of nowhere.”91 Most explana-
tions of thought insertion descend from source-moni-
toring accounts of intentional action.92,93 These accounts 
distinguish sense of ownership (the experience that the 
action belongs to oneself, that the bodily movement 
is one’s own) from sense of agency (the experience of 
intending and controlling the action).94,95 When sense 
of agency is absent, but sense of ownership is intact, 
the patients experience their body performing actions, 
which are nonetheless not felt to be theirs. This way of 
conceptualizing the experience treats sense or ownership 
as a form of subjective awareness of bodily occupation 
of space.96 It also is worth noting that some authors94 
propose the sense of agency and ownership are in fact 
2-fold, consisting of a “feeling” and a “judgment”that 
incorporate bottom-up sensory information (feeling) and 
top-down beliefs (judgment). From this perspective, one 
could have a mere feeling of intending the movement but 
deny the movement is indeed initiated by themselves (due 
to higher-order factors or conflicts perhaps), such as in 
experiences associated with passivity phenomena. Here, 
we use the term “sense” to refer to the prereflective feeling 
of  agency/ownership in Synofzik’s account.
Source-monitoring accounts of thought insertion 
decompose the experience of subjectivity into a sense of 
ownership and a sense of agency for thought (SOT and 
SOAT, respectively). Thought insertion, on this view, 
derives from the experience of SOT for thought unac-
companied by SOAT.97 There is, however, no straightfor-
ward analogy between thoughts and actions. Actions are 
monitored, at different levels of cognition, for consist-
ency with intentions, generating (in this account) a sense 
of agency. But we do not, in general, intend our thoughts. 
So SOAT cannot depend on comparison of actual and 
intended/predicted thoughts.98
Nonetheless, the analogy has been pursued in dif-
ferent ways, each of which argues that a characteristic 
SOAT goes missing in thought insertion, leaving SOT 
for thoughts intact. The source of a SOAT might be a 
sense of agency for speech production (on the plausible 
assumption that the thoughts in question are episodes 
of inner speech),99,100 protention (online anticipation of 
the temporal structure of episodes of thought)101 or ego-
tonia (compatibility with self-representation).102 The sug-
gestion is that a monitoring process fails to detect a match 
between an occurrent thought and the relevant generative 
process, as outlined in the “Inner Speech/Comparator 
Model”section.103 Another proposal is that source moni-
toring is between background psychology (understood 
as the totality of tacit representations on which thinking 
depends) and conscious thought.96
A difficulty with all these proposals is accounting for 
normal and pathological (eg, in obsessive compulsive 
disorder) cases of unbidden or intrusive thoughts. Such 
thoughts arise in the mind in an unpredicted manner but 
are not experienced or explained as inserted. Another 
difficulty with such proposals is more fundamental. To 
preserve the Cartesian intuition, their proponents divide 
subjectivity into SOAT and SOT, arguing that SOT is 
intact in thought insertion. It is not clear that this reflects 
patients’ experience. Patients say that the thoughts are 
“not theirs.”91,97 If  we take this seriously, then perhaps the 
idea of an intact SOT with its connotation of intact “inner 
space” or mental boundaries needs to be rethought. One 
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Fig. 1. A hierarchical Bayesian model of conditioned hallucinations. Reproduced with permission.In this study,88 subjects with and with-
out psychosis (P+, P−, respectively) and with and without auditory verbal hallucinations (H+, H−, respectively) were conditioned to associate 
tones presented at threshold with a concurrent checkerboard stimulus (A). This association was then tested by presenting the checkerboard 
alone and recording subjects’ reports of hearing the tone: the probability of presentation of a subthreshold or absent tone increased over 
blocks (B). Subjects with hallucinations (irrespective of psychosis) were more likely to hallucinate tones (D, ***P<.001). The evolution 
of this association over time was modeled using a hierarchical Bayesian model (C), in which the first level (X1) is the belief  in the presence 
of the tone, the second level (X2) is the association of the tone with the checkerboard, and the third (X3) is the rate of change of the asso-
ciation, and subject-specific parameters ω and θ affect how quickly these beliefs change at levels 2 and 3. At X3, there was a significant 
block-by-psychosis interaction (E, *p< 0.05). The belief  about having heard a tone (ie, at X1) on one trial—in Bayesian terms, the “poster-
ior”—then becomes the prior belief  in the next trial, and the weighting of this prior belief  over the incoming sensory evidence is parameter-
ized by ν. Crucially, ν was higher in hallucinators (irrespective of psychosis): ie, hallucinators overweighted their (empirically learned) prior 
beliefs in this task (F, ***P<.001). One could likewise model voice perception using a hierarchical model in which inputs are sounds and 
higher levels encode beliefs about phonemes, words, sentences, and speaker identities. In such a model, verbal hallucinations could result 
from a similar overweighting of prior beliefs.104
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possibility, consistent with recent Bayesian approaches 
to cognition, is that the boundary of inner space is not 
an intrinsic or given feature of cognition but is actively 
constructed by the mind. Henriksenet  al27 suggest that 
persons diagnosed with schizophrenia experience their 
interiority as an unusually concrete form of inner space, 
possibly due to disruption of a natural, embodied rela-
tion to exterior space, with the result that thoughts are 
given spatial, object-like qualities. Similarly, whether a 
representation is experienced as internal or external to 
the mind may depend on the predictive model deployed 
for the task; persons diagnosed with schizophrenia may 
inappropriately use external models for internal events.
Some ingenious paradigms addressed this issue by 
defining neural correlates of AVH and thought inser-
tion. Jardri et al101 found that transcranial magnetic stim-
ulation over the left temporal–parietal junction (TPJ) 
reduced AVH and the right TPJ improved agency for 
inner speech. This result is consistent with others sug-
gesting that sense of agency depends on modulation of 
inferior parietal areas by TPJ. Note however that the sub-
jects here did not report thought insertion. The clearest 
result in this area is from an experiment contrasting hyp-
notically induced thought insertion, which found “spe-
cifically, reduced activity in language production regions, 
and not over-activation of cerebellar-parietal regions, was 
present during thought insertion” (added italics).100 The 
same experiment found reduced activation in supplemen-
tary motor area in experience of both thought insertion 
and delusions of alien control.
Interestingly, phenomenological theories of psycho-
sis provide little clarification regarding similarities and 
differences between AVH and thought insertion. One 
suggestion is that there is little or no meaningful differ-
ence between these two phenomena, or at least between 
thought insertion and the more thought-like, inner speech 
forms of AVH.69,105 Instead, it is suggested that the dif-
ferent ways they are represented or described by patients 
may simply reflect individual or cultural differences in the 
way anomalous experiences are conceptualized and com-
municated.105,106 However, advances in psychosis research 
including those on neural computation might be useful 
for clarifying the shared (or disparate) phenomenology 
of thought insertion and various forms of AVH.
Conclusion
Some tentative suggestions for further research and 
limitations of the current approach can be found in 
Supplementary Materials. In this conceptual review, we 
present some of the phenomenological observations and 
computational models in the study of AVH and delusions 
of thought interference in psychosis. These have a partic-
ular focus on the merging between (delusional) thought 
and (hallucinatory) perception, which are embedded in 
current theories of both computational psychiatry and 
phenomenological psychopathology. We argue that these 
two approaches are indispensable to advancing the study 
of psychosis and urge researchers and clinicians to keep 
the patients’ reality in mind when considering models and 
explanations. We are fully aware that incorporating dif-
ferent lines of inquiry is only the beginning of a dialogic 
process between seemingly disparate fields in psychopa-
thology research, and there is no single approach that 
can account for the sheer complexity of mental illnesses 
such as schizophrenia. Nevertheless, interdisciplinary 
research and integrative approaches are crucial in creat-
ing a mutual understanding and facilitating collaborative 
efforts, with the ultimate goal of maximizing benefits to 
the quality of life of patients with psychosis. The real-
ization that phenomenology and computation work in 
conjunction and inform each other is undoubtedly a vital 
first step toward achieving this goal.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material is available at Schizophrenia 
Bulletin online.
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